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Abstract 
Different  economic  and  financial  structures  require 
different crisis responses. Different crises also require 
different  tools  and  resources.  The  first  ‘stage’  of  the 
financial crisis (2007-09) was similar on both sides of 
the Atlantic, and the response was also quite similar. 
The second stage of the crisis is unique to the euro area. 
Increasing  financial  disintegration  within  the  region 
has forced the ECB to become the central counterparty 
for  the  entire  cross-border  banking  market  and  to 
intervene in the sovereign bond market of some stressed 
countries.  The  actions  undertaken  by  the  European 
Central  Bank  (ECB),  however,  have  not  always 
represented the best response, in terms of effectiveness, 
consistency  and  transparency.  This is  especially  true 
for  the  Securities  Markets  Programme  (SMP):  by  de 
facto imposing its absolute seniority during the Greek 
PSI (private sector involvement), the ECB has probably 
killed its future effectiveness. 
Executive summary 
Different  economic  and  financial  structures 
require different crisis responses. Different crises 
also  require  different  tools  and  resources.  It  is 
crucial, in this sense, to separate the analysis of the 
action  of  the  leading  central  banks  into  two 
phases.  In  phase  I,  following  the  burst  of  the 
global  financial  crisis  (2007-09),  monetary  policy 
responses  undertaken  by  the  ECB,  the  Bank  of 
England (BoE) and the US Federal Reserve (FED) 
were quite similar. On both sides of the Atlantic, 
these  included  the  extension  of  the  scope  of 
existing facilities as well as the engineering of new 
mechanisms  to  facilitate  access  of  financial 
institutions to official liquidity. 
The second phase of the crisis (2010-12), however, 
is  unique  to  the  euro  area  since  the  degree  of 
financial  stress  and  risk  perception  dominating 
the  EU  financial  markets  was  unprecedented. 
After 2010, the main concern in the US was about 
the  economic  cycle.  In  order  to  boost  a  weak 
economy through lower long-term interest rates, 
the  FED  undertook  massive  asset  purchases 
financed  by  central  bank  money,  the  so-called 
‘quantitative  easing’  (QE),  leading  to  the 
accumulation of $1.6 trillion in Treasuries on its 
balance  sheet.  A  similar  approach  was  followed 
by  the  BoE,  which  kept  purchasing  gilts  and 
expanding its balance sheet up to £325 billion.  
In  the  euro  area,  the  situation  was  completely 
different.  In  the  spring  of  2010,  the  crisis  took 
another  turn  and  the  ECB  response  shifted  to 
another level. In May 2010, as markets got into a 
panic about a possible Greek insolvency, the ECB 
Council  decided  to  intervene  in  the  sovereign 
bond markets of troubled countries, through the 
SMP. Formally the programme did not constitute 
QE;  however,  given  the  huge  amount  of  funds 
that,  at  the  same  time,  were  supplied  to  the CENTRAL BANKS IN TIMES OF CRISIS: THE FED VS. THE ECB | 2 
 
banking sector, it is impossible to disentangle the 
sterilization operations. Lastly, in December 2011, 
the  ECB  decided  to  implement  a  new  set  of 
longer-term  refinancing  operations  (LTROs) 
amounting  to  around  €1,000  billion,  aiming  to 
sustain a broken interbank market. 
The  most  evident  consequence  of  these 
unconventional measures has been the increase in 
the size of the central banks’ balance sheets. Total 
assets of BoE and the Fed almost tripled in about 
five years, while that of the ECB almost doubled. 
A  simple  comparison  between  the  sizes  of  the 
balance sheets is, however, misleading. While the 
Federal Reserve and the BoE have done QE, the 
ECB  had  to  respond  to  increasing  financial 
disintegration  within  the  region.  The  ECB  has 
been forced to become the central counterparty of 
the  entire  cross-border  banking  market  and  to 
intervene in the sovereign bond market of some 
stressed  countries.  Therefore,  its  main  policy 
approach can be qualified as ‘credit easing’. 
In  assessing  the  effectiveness  of  the  two 
approaches,  it  emerges  that  while  the  ECB  has 
responded  massively  to  the  crisis  (LTRO  and 
SMP), it has also tried to minimise its own risk. 
Alas,  this  implies  that  its  policy  cannot  be  fully 
effective.  This  approach  is  significantly  different 
from the one chosen by the FED, which showed its 
willingness  to  take  on  credit  risk  in  order  to 
provide relief to private investors, who therefore 
could recover quickly.  
1.  Introduction 
Different  economic  and  financial  structures 
require different crisis responses. This paper offers 
a comparison between the different actions taken 
by  the  US  Federal  Reserve  and  the  European 
Central Bank since late 2007.1 It is crucial, in this 
sense,  to  separate  the  analysis  in  two  phases:  a 
first  ‘stage’,  corresponding  to  the  burst  of  the 
financial crisis (2007-09) and a second stage of the 
crisis (2010-12) that has characteristics unique to 
the euro area and thus has required specific and 
different actions of the ECB.  
 
 
                                                   
1 In the course of the paper we also make reference to the 
crisis’ response of the Bank of England. 
2.  Phase I: Similar crisis, similar policies 
When the global financial crisis first broke in late 
August 2007, the large western central banks (the 
ECB,  the  Federal  Reserve  and  the  Bank  of 
England) promptly responded by cutting interest 
rates down to close to zero and adopting a large 
set  of  unconventional  policy  measures.  On  both 
sides of the Atlantic, these included the extension 
of the scope of existing facilities, most notably the 
duration of the usual refinancing operations and 
lowering the standards for eligibility of collateral 
applied  to  banks.  But  central  banks  also 
engineered  new  mechanisms.  For  instance  the 
Bank  of  England  (BoE)  swapped  high-quality 
illiquid assets from banks in return for Treasuries. 
The FED broadened the set of counterparties for 
liquidity  operations  but  also  opened  a  series  of 
swap  facilities  to  allow  other  central  banks  to 
provide  banks  locally  with  dollars  as  that 
currency is widely used in inter-bank transactions 
outside the US. 
Despite  the  scale  of  the  response,  the  financial 
crisis intensified in the fall of 2008 following the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers. As the main effect of 
the  collapse  was  a  loss  of  confidence  in  the 
interbank  system  and  a  reluctance  of  banks  to 
lend  to  each  other,  the  primary  objective  of 
monetary  authorities  became  to  unblock  the 
interbank  markets  by substantially  easing  access 
of  the  financial  system  to  official  liquidity.  In 
order  to  achieve  this  objective,  central  banks 
intervened  more  directly  to  improve  credit 
conditions in particular markets segments. Those 
measures  included  expanding  further  the 
availability  of  credit  to  financial  institutions,  a 
further reduction in main interest rates and asset 
purchases financed by central bank money, the so-
called  ‘quantitative  easing’.  While  the  Bank  of 
England privileged the purchase of medium and 
long-term government bonds (£200 billion of gilts 
between  March  2009  and  January  2010),  the 
Federal  Reserve  purchased  commercial  papers, 
asset-backed  securities  and  other  private  assets 
containing  credit  risk,  for  about  $1,000  billion 
during the year 2009. At this stage of the crisis, the 
FED was thus taking on credit risk (for instance 
through  the  so-called  TALF,  the  Term  Asset-
Backed  Securities  Loan  Facility)2  and  only  later 
                                                   
2 According to the FED website,:“The TALF is intended to 
assist financial markets in accommodating the credit needs of 
 3 | GROS, ALCIDI & GIOVANNI 
 
did the emphasis shift to sustaining the economy 
via  lower  interest  rates  (see  below  on  the 
difference between QE and credit easing).  
Compared  to  the  over  $1,000  billion  of  asset 
purchases by the FED, the ECB’s Covered Bond 
Purchase  Programme  (CBPP),  which  started  in 
July  2009,  of  €60  billion  was  puny.  Instead  the 
ECB  put  in  place  a  series  of  other  equally 
unconventional  measures  for  about  €300  billion, 
focusing on expanding the provision of credit to 
banks in the framework of the so-called ‘enhanced 
credit support programme’, in order to assure the 
well  functioning  of  the  credit  mechanism  in  the 
euro area: 
  switching  from  variable  rate  tender  to  fixed 
rate-full  allotment  tender  procedure  in  all 
refinancing operations; 
  extensions  of  the  list  of  assets  accepted  as 
eligible collateral for refinancing operations to
                                                                                       
consumers  and  businesses  by  facilitating  the  issuance  of 
asset-backed  securities  collateralized  by  a  variety  of 
consumer  and  business  loans.  The  loans  provided  through 
the  TALF  to  eligible  borrowers  are  non-recourse,  meaning 
that  the  obligation  of  the  borrower  can  be  discharged  by 
surrendering  the  collateral  to  the  FRBNY"  (see 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h41/current/h41.h
tm#h41tab1). 
further ease access to Eurosystem operations in 
an attempt to reduce asset-side constraints on 
banks’ balance sheets; 
  setting  up  of  additional  longer-term 
refinancing operations for financial institutions 
with a maturity of up to six months; and 
  providing from time to time liquidity in foreign 
currency,  through  the swap  line  provided  by 
the FED. 
The  common  effect  of  these  operations  was  an 
unprecedented  expansion  of  central  banks’ 
balance  sheets:  Figure  1 shows  that  the  increase 
has been particularly important in the UK, where 
it reached 300% between May 2006 and May 2012. 
In relative terms, the increase in the ECB balance 
sheet looks small with ‘only’ 170% over the same 
period, while the Fed expansion has been of the 
order of 230%. CENTRAL BANKS IN TIMES OF CRISIS: THE FED VS. THE ECB | 4 
 
3.  Phase II: Risk management vs. 
standard economic policy 
The second stage of the crisis (2010-12) is unique 
to the euro area since the degree of financial stress 
and risk perception in the financial markets were 
not the same on both sides of the Atlantic. In the 
US,  the  main  concern  was  about  the  economic 
cycle: the economy was not growing robustly and 
the labour market not recovering. A more intense 
stimulus  through  monetary  policy  was  then 
deemed  necessary.  In  August  2010,  the  FED 
decided  to  implement  further  asset  purchases 
through  open  market  operations,  buying  $30 
billion  of  short-term  Treasury  notes  between 
August  and  September.  In  November  2010,  a 
second  wave  of  quantitative  easing  was 
announced  leaving  the  amount  of  Treasuries  on 
its  balance  sheet  at  $1.6  trillion.  A  similar 
approach  was  followed  by  the  BoE,  which  kept 
purchasing gilts and expanding its balance sheet 
up to £325 billion. 
In continental Europe, the situation was different 
and in the spring of 2010, the crisis took another 
turn with the epicentre in the euro area and the 
ECB response shifting to another level. Until 2010, 
dealing with divergent sovereign bond yields did 
not represent a challenge for ECB. 
The  interest  rate  spreads  on  sovereign  bonds 
issued by each of the euro area member states fell 
almost to zero during the period 2002-07 driven 
by  the  underestimation  of  intra-countries 
differences  and  internal  disequilibria.  While 
international  investors  were  considering  Greek 
and German bonds the same, the ECB did/could 
not  obviously  do  otherwise,  and  accepted 
sovereign  securities  as  collateral  of  the  same 
quality regardless of the country that was issuing 
the paper. 
In May 2010, as markets got into a panic about a 
possible  Greek  insolvency,  the  ECB  Council 
decided  to  intervene  and  started  buying  Greek 
bonds in the secondary markets in order to reduce 
the pressure and give the euro area governments 
the necessary time to finalize the European rescue 
fund,  the  European  Financial  Stability  Facility 
(EFSF).  In  these  exceptional  circumstances, 
described  by  President  Trichet  as  “the  most 
difficult situation since the Second World War – 
perhaps even since the First World War”,3 the ECB 
launched  the  Securities  Markets  Programme 
(SMP).  The  official  explanation  was  the  need  to 
restore  the  proper  functioning  of  the  monetary 
policy  transmission  mechanisms  in  order  to 
maintain medium term price stability.4  
Figure 2 shows how the purchases made by the 
ECB under the two open market operations (SMP 
and CBPP) appear very limited in comparison to 
the QE undertaken by the FED and the BoE. 
In addition, on several occasions, the ECB lowered 
the  threshold  for  the  eligibility  of  debt 
instruments  issued  or  guaranteed  by  the 
governments of the most troubled countries.5 This 
was  needed  given  that  the  existing  rules  for 
eligible  marketable  assets  required  fulfilment  of 
standards of credit quality in order to be accepted 
as  collateral  in  monetary  policy  operations. 
Subsequently,  these  rules  were  changed  to 
establish  a sliding scale  of  haircuts  defined  as a 
function  of  credit  ratings  and  to  be  applied  to 
eligible securities.  
Formally the SMP did not constitute QE since the 
ECB  sterilised  its  purchases  by  conducting 
liquidity-absorbing  operations  of  the  same 
amount.  In  reality,  however,  it  is  impossible  to 
disentangle these sterilization operations and their 
effects, since the ECB maintained a full allotment 
policy on all (standard and long-term) refinancing 
operations. 
 
                                                   
3  See:  http://www.ecb.int/press/key/date/2010/html/ 
sp100515.en.html. 
4  The  official  communiqué  read:  “address  the  severe 
tensions in certain market segments which are hampering 
the monetary policy transmission mechanism and thereby 
the effective conduct of monetary policy oriented towards 
price stability in the medium term”. 
5 The ECB changed eligibility rules for Greece, Ireland and 
Portugal, see its press releases for 3 May 2010: 
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2010/html/p
r100503.en.html; for 31March 2011: http://www.ecb.int/ 
press/pr/date/2011/html/pr110331_2.en.html; and 7 
July 2011: http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/ 
2011/html/pr110707_1.en.html. CENTRAL BANKS IN TIMES OF CRISIS: THE FED VS. THE ECB | 5 
 
Figure 2. Central banks’ securities purchases as % of GDP 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration on ECB, FED, BoE data. 
In  other  words,  liquidity  was  absorbed  to  offset 
bond  purchases  while  unlimited  liquidity  was 
provided  to  banks  through  standard  and 
unconventional refinancing operations. Moreover, 
technically,  the  liquidity  absorption  (for  the 
purpose  of  sterilization)  consisted  of  the  ECB 
attracting  fixed-term  deposits  from  commercial 
banks.  However,  the  deposits  that  commercial 
banks  were  anyway  holding  at  the  ECB  were 
always much larger than the amount required for 
‘sterilisation’ operations. When commercial banks 
park hundreds of billions of excess liquidity at the 
central bank, it does not make much sense to insist 
on a fine difference between QE and a (sterilized) 
‘securities purchase programme’. 
Finally, on 8 December 2011, the ECB decided to 
implement  a  new  set  of  longer-term  refinancing 
operations (LTROs) with a maturity of 36 months 
and the option of early repayment after one year. 
The  first  operation,  conducted  on  21  December, 
saw the participation of around 500 banks asking 
for  €490  billion,  while  in  the  second  one, 
conducted in February 2012, 800 banks asked for 
€530  billion  (see  the  red  square  in Figure  4). 
Section  4  offers  a  critical  evaluation  of  this 
operation,  but  at  this  point  it  is  important  to 
remark that while the LTRO represents a peculiar 
action of the ECB during this second stage of the 
crisis, the FED had followed a similar approach in 
the early stage of the financial crisis in 2008 and 
had  moved  after  2010  to  direct  injection  of 
liquidity through the QE.  
4.  The role of transparency 
In  a  ranking  compiled  in  2007  among  the  most 
transparent  central  banks  in  the  world,  the  ECB 
ranked  fifth,  after  (in  descending  order)  the 
Reserve  Bank  of  New  Zealand,  the  Swedish 
Riksbank,  the  Bank  of  England,  the  Czech 
National  Bank  and  the  Bank  of  Canada.6 
Unfortunately the same transparency has not been 
assured  during  the  SMP.  The  ECB  has  only 
published the weekly amount of bonds purchased 
without unveiling any other details, neither about 
the  composition  and  maturity  of  the  purchases 
nor  the  criteria  for  purchases  or  the  planned 
amount  of  the  programme.  Data  on  weekly 
                                                   
6 See Dincer & Eichengreen (2009). 
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purchases suggest that the ECB has embarked on 
market  intervention  intermittently.  Market 
estimates  indicate  that  in  the  first  phase  (from 
May  2010  until  July  2011),  the  main  (possibly 
only) target was Greek bonds, followed by Irish 
and Portuguese bonds. By contrast, after the 7th of 
August  2011,  when  the  programme  was 
reactivated after stagnating for about one year, the 
purchase was directed toward Spanish and Italian 
sovereign bonds.  
The  ECB's  lack  of  transparency  appears  even 
greater if compared to the UK and US quantitative 
easing  programmes.  When  the  Bank  of  England 
announced its QE, it stated that “the Committee 
agreed that the Bank should finance £75 billion of 
asset  purchase  (...)  the  majority  of  the  overall 
purchase by value over the next three months will 
be  of  gilts”7  and  added  all  rules  that  it  would 
follow  in  the  bond  purchase.  Similarly,  the  FED 
Committee  announced  “to  purchase  up  to  $300 
billion of longer-term Treasury securities over the 
next  six  months”,8  thus  specifying  explicitly  the 
type  of  securities  and  the  length  of  the 
programme.  
In  disclosing  detailed  information,  the  BoE  and 
the  FED  aimed  to  ensure  the  accountability  of 
both  programmes  to  British  and  American 
taxpayers.  The  ECB  failed  in  this  respect.  The 
absence of transparency has been often justified as 
necessary for the programme to be effective since 
a  full  disclosure  of  the  purchase  could  have 
caused  an  uproar  and  worsened  the  financial 
(in)stability.  In  fact,  this  is  weak  argument. 
Traders could quite easily match market data with 
ECB  purchase  announcements  and  thus  identify 
the bonds targeted by the SMP. 
                                                   
7 See http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/ 
news/2009/019.htm and http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/ 
markets/marketnotice090305.pdf for a detailed explanation of 
the purchase programme. 
8 See http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/ 
monetary/20090318a.htm. 
Another  issue  is  the  transparency  concerning 
recipients of ECB financing, especially through the 
LTRO. The €1 trillion channelled into banks has 
raised concerns about the use made by banks of 
this money. The fall in the spreads of Spain and 
Italy  in  the  first  quarter  of  this  year  seemed  to 
suggest that this part of the funds were used to 
sustain the demand for peripheral countries’ debt, 
but the lack of details does not allow a rigorous 
analysis of the effects of this operation. 
5.  Effects of policy measures on balance 
sheets: Credit easing vs. quantitative 
easing 
The  most  evident  consequence  of  such 
unconventional measures has been the increase in 
the size of the central bank’s balance sheet. Total 
assets of BoE and the FED almost tripled in about 
five years, while that of the ECB almost doubled 
(although  starting  at  a  higher  level  in  terms  of 
GDP). 
A  simple  comparison  between  the  size  of  the 
balance  sheets  or  their  increase  is  misleading, 
however. The magnitudes are by now similar, but 
there are two qualitative differences between the 
ECB and the FED which are more important than 
mere  balance-sheet  size.  The  FED  buys  almost 
exclusively  risk-free  assets  like  US  government 
bonds  or  government-guaranteed  bonds  (see 
Figure  3  for  the  evolution  in  the  FED  balance 
sheet), whereas the ECB has bought much smaller 
quantities  of  risky  assets  (see  Figure  4,  the  pink 
area representing the SMP), for which the market 
was drying up. In addition, the FED has lent very 
little  to  banks,  whereas  the  ECB  has  lent  huge 
amounts to weak banks with no access to market 
funding  (see  the  red  square  in  Figure  4).  The 
Federal Reserve does Quantitative Easing (trying 
to lower the riskless interest rate), while the ECB 
does ‘credit easing’.9 
 
                                                   
9 This section is based on Gros (2012). CENTRAL BANKS IN TIMES OF CRISIS: THE FED VS. THE ECB | 7 
 
Figure 3. Evolution of FED balance sheet ($ millions) 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on FED data. 
Figure 4. Evolution of ECB balance sheet 2007-2012 (€ millions) 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on ECB data. 
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Quantitative easing is supposed to stimulate the 
economy when the central bank lowers long-term 
(riskless) interest rates by buying large amounts of 
longer-term government bonds with the deposits 
that it receives from banks. "By contrast, the ECB’s 
credit easing is motivated by a practical concern: banks 
from some parts of the euro area – namely, from the 
distressed  countries  on  its  periphery  –  have  been 
effectively cut off from the inter-bank market."10 
The  difference  between  these  two approaches  is 
reflected  in  the  stance  taken  by  world’s  two 
biggest central banks vis-à-vis risk-taking. 
By buying US government bonds, the FED does 
not incur any credit risk, but it is taking interest-
rate risk. The FED engages, like a typical bank, in 
‘maturity  transformation’.  It  uses  short-term 
deposits  to  finance  the  acquisition  of  long-term 
securities. With short-term deposit rates close to 
zero and long-term rates at around 2-3%, the FED 
is earning a nice gain equal to about 2-3% per year 
on its bond portfolio of now roughly $1.5 trillion, 
which means about $30-45 billion per annum. For 
the  FED  this  gain  is  secondary  to  achieving  the 
overall aim of lowering interest rates.  
While  QE  involves  little  risk  for  the  FED, 
equivalent  operations  are  costly  for  commercial 
banks. Indeed, under current financial supervision 
rules,  banks  are  obliged  to  limit  maturity 
mismatch  and  are  required  to  have  some  long-
term  funding  against  long-term  commitments. 
However,  since  long-term  funding  is  more 
expensive, the attractiveness of purchasing long-
term  securities  is  much  lower  for  commercial 
banks. By contrast, the FED can determine its own 
cost of funds. It sets short-term interest rates and 
affects the long-term ones. Hence it can manage 
this risk.11 
By  contrast,  the  ECB  does  not  assume  any 
maturity  risk  with  its  LTRO,  because  the  rate  it 
charges on banks is the average of the short-term 
interest  rates  that  will  materialize  over  the  next 
three years. It does, however, take on credit risk, 
because it is lending to banks that cannot obtain 
funding anywhere else.  
                                                   
10 Gros (2012). 
11  Certainly  the  FED  would  inflict  losses  on  itself  by 
increasing  interest  rates.  Therefore,  the  recent 
announcement that interest rates will be kept low for an 
extended period might also have been motivated by more 
than concern about a sluggish recovery. 
"The banks that are parking their money at the ECB 
(receiving only 0.25% interest) are clearly not the same 
ones that are taking out three-year loans at 1%. The 
deposits  come  largely  from  northern  European  banks 
(mainly  German  and  Dutch),  and  LTRO  loans  go 
largely to banks in southern Europe (mainly Italy and 
Spain). In other words, the ECB has become the central 
counterparty  to  a  banking  system  that  is  de  facto 
segmented  along national  lines.  The  real  problem  for 
the ECB is that it is not properly insured against the 
credit  risk  that  it  is  taking  on.  The  0.75%  spread 
between deposit and lending rates (yielding €7.5 billion 
per year) does not provide much of a cushion against 
the losses that are looming in Greece, where the ECB 
has €130 billion at stake. 
The  ECB  had  to  act  when  the  eurozones’s  financial 
system was close to collapse at the end of last year. But 
its room for maneuvre is even more restricted than that 
of the FED. Its balance sheet is now saddled with huge 
credit risks over which it has very little control. It can 
only  hope  that  politicians  deliver  the  adjustments  in 
southern  Europe  that  would  allow  the  LTRO’s 
recipient banks to survive."12 
6.  How successful have central banks’ 
measures been? 
There  are  different  channels  through  which 
injections of money into the economy (e.g. direct 
asset  purchases  in  open  market  operations)  by 
central  banks  could  affect  the  economy.  If  the 
central bank intervenes in a market segment for 
which  demand  is  scarce,  the  asset  purchase  is 
likely to have a significant impact on prices and 
therefore interest rates. Considering the effect of 
the QE on the British economy (Joyce et al., 2010), 
it could be seen as the asset prices in the United 
Kingdom  recovered  substantially  during  2009 
(although  not  all  of  the  improvement  can  be 
attributed  to  QE):  authors’  estimations  suggest 
that gilt yields were about 100 basis points lower 
than they would otherwise have been without QE.  
Focusing on the US experience, there seems to be 
some evidence supporting the effectiveness of the 
QE: Gagnon et al. (2011) examine the effect of the 
December 2008 and March 2009 instalments of the 
Fed large-scale asset purchases and find that they 
raised  market  expectations  of  further  asset 
purchases, thus reducing the yield on long-term 
assets. The overall size of the reduction in the ten-
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year  term  premium  has  been  estimated  to  be 
somewhere between 30 and 100 basis points. The 
programmes had an even more powerful effect on 
longer-term  interest  rates  on  agency  debt  and 
agency  mortgage-backed  securities  (MBS)  by 
improving market liquidity and removing assets 
with  high  prepayment  risk  from  private 
portfolios.  Neely  (2011)  also  shows  that  the 
‘quantitative easing’ conducted by the Fed in 2010 
has succeeded in reducing international long-term 
interest  rates,  while  Hamilton  &  Wu  (2011) 
estimate that the effects of the Fed action to sell 
$400  billion  in  short-term  securities  and 
simultaneously  purchasing  $400  billion  in  long-
term securities, have reduced the slope of the term 
structure of interest rates by 25 basis points.  
Alas,  evidence  of  the  effectiveness  of  the  ECB 
approach  is  not  encouraging.  When  in 
August 2011, the ECB intervened in the market to 
buy Italian and Spanish bonds, yields experienced 
the  largest  fall  since  the  euro  began  in  1999.  A 
similar  reaction  had  materialized  for  the  Greek, 
Irish and Portuguese bonds in May 2010 when the 
SMP  was  launched.  But  as  designed  and 
conducted until now, the SMP has not delivered a 
long-term  turnaround  in  the  secondary  market: 
market judgment about troubled countries has not 
changed after the ECB intervention.  
Figure 5. ECB SMP purchase and GIP spreads (2010) 
 
Sources: ECB statistical Data warehouse and Bloomberg. 
As Figure 5 shows, the action undertaken by the 
ECB trough the SMP has initially stabilised market 
conditions of Greek, Irish and Portuguese bonds, 
but only temporarily. 
The ECB did not manage to achieve the unspoken 
aim of the SMP, namely to lower the risk premia 
on  peripheral  government  debt  securities.  There 
are two explanations for this. First, if risk premia 
did  not  result  from  mere  market  panic,  but 
actually reflected fundamentals (Krugman, 1988) a 
very  limited  intervention  is  unlikely  to  be 
effective. Moreover, there are now signs that the 
SMP  could  actually  be  counterproductive.  The 
reason is that during the de facto default of Greece 
of  March  2012,  the  ECB  imposed  its  absolute 
seniority. When the ECB purchased Greek bonds 
in 2010, it did so in the private market and it was 
generally  assumed  that  it  would  therefore  be 
treated pari passu as private investors. However, 
this  was  not  the  case.  A  procedural  trick  – 
changing the international securities identification 
number (ISIN) – was used to exclude the bonds 
held  by  the  ECB  from  the  PSI  operation.  The 
official justification was that, as the ECB is acting 
for  a  ‘public  policy  purpose’,  it should  not  bear 
any loss. 
In  reality  the  question  is  not  whether  the  ECB 
should  have  fully  participated  in  the  PSI,  but 
whether it could have just relinquished its bond 
holdings for the price at which it had purchased 
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them.  By  requiring  that  the  nominal  amount 
should be paid back on bonds that it had acquired 
much below par, the ECB was telling the private 
investors  that  the  haircut  they  had  to  bear  was 
larger.  Investors  are  now  likely  to  take  this 
‘subordination’ effect into account, every time the 
ECB  is  involved.  This  implies  that  further  SMP 
purchases  could  actually  now  have  become 
counterproductive  and  might  explain  why  the 
ECB has not re-activated the SMP despite record 
risk  premia  and  borrowing  costs  in  Spain  and 
Italy. 
7.  Concluding remarks 
Different  economic  and  financial  structures 
require different crisis responses. Different crises 
also require different tools and resources. For this 
reason, in order to understand and assess central 
banks’  reactions  to  the  crisis,  it  is  crucial  to 
distinguish the first phase of the global financial 
crisis (2007-09), which was rather similar on both 
sides of the Atlantic, from the second stage of the 
crisis that erupted in Europe and it is unique to 
the euro area. 
While in the first stage the reaction was similar in 
the  objective  and  to  some  extent  in  the  tools, 
significant differences in the approach and in the 
effectiveness have emerged after 2010.  
During  the  first  leg  of  the  crisis,  the  Federal 
Reserve took considerable risks by providing no-
recourse  loans  against  collateral,  which  at  the 
time, appeared to be ‘toxic’. The justification was 
that the market was in a state of panic.  Ex post 
this judgment proved correct. The panic subsided 
and the Federal Reserve did not make any losses.  
As  markets  stabilized  the  Federal  Reserve  then 
tried to sustain employment by reducing interest 
rates, first the short term ones it controls directly 
and  later  longer  term  interest  rates  through  its 
‘quantitative easing’ and the ‘operation twist’. 
The ECB’s policy was not too different from that 
of  the  FED  during  the  first  leg  of  the  crisis.  It 
extended  the  provision  of  central  bank  funds  to 
banks and bought some assets (covered bonds) for 
which  the  market  did  not  seem  to  function 
properly.  However, in the euro area the general 
financial crisis mutated into a ‘euro crisis’ when 
savers  in  Northern  Europe  (especially  Germany 
and the Netherlands) started withdrawing credit 
from the countries in the euro ‘periphery’.   
Overall, this means that while the ECB responded 
massively to the crisis through ‘credit easing’, it 
was trying at the same time to minimise its own 
risk. Yet this implies that its policy cannot be fully 
effective.  As  explained  earlier,  this  is  especially 
manifest in the SMP. As the markets now take the 
super  seniority  of  the  ECB  into  account,  any 
further asset purchase by the ECB might actually 
be counterproductive. It could even increase the 
risk premium because investors know that fewer 
resources will be available as the ECB has a first 
call on the payments a government can make.  
In  addition,  there  is  now  a  danger  that  other 
instruments  of  the  ECB  might  also  become  less 
effective.  With  the  LTRO,  the  ECB  not  only 
provided  longer-term  funding  against  an 
extended pool of assets eligible as collateral, it also 
increased  considerably  the  haircuts  applied  to 
these  newly  eligible  assets,  in  some  cases  up  to 
50%  and  even  75%.  This  means  that  huge 
overcollateralization  is  required  to  access  the 
LTRO. Banks have to pledge assets between two 
and four times the amount of the funding they are 
receiving. Because  of  this,  in  case  of  insolvency, 
(unsecured) creditors of banks will have little left 
for  themselves  and  private  investors  will  thus 
become even more reluctant to provide the banks 
with funding. There is thus a danger that even the 
LTRO might not work if it were tried again. 
The  attempt  by  the  ECB  to  limit  its  own  risk  is 
understandable,  yet  the  consequences  for  the 
effectiveness  of  the  policy  should  also  be  fully 
understood.  This  approach  is  significantly 
different from the one chosen by the FED, which 
by  providing  no–recourse  loans  to  the  private 
sector, through the TALF, gave a strong signal. It 
was willing to take on the credit risk of private 
investors,  who  were  therefore  able  to  recover 
more quickly.  
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